A few years ago, in an earlier essay on the Italian Forum, I argued that the piazza in Leichhardt was a 'bad translation' of an Italian square.
1 My intention was not derogatory; it was instead aimed at bringing to the fore of critical discourse the quintessential openness of translation, whose primary function is that of reminding its audience that the original is somewhere else. The logical conclusion of that preliminary interrogation of the Italian Forum invites me to argue today that, paradoxically, 'good translations' must be incomplete, clearly different-not so much to state their individual agency (which however they have the right to do) as to keep the creative process of exchange and encounter ongoing. The Italian Forum in Sydney is a significant example of transnational language precisely because its language and symbolism are ostensibly interstitial, in--between, resisting established values and tastes readily connected with a nation state. There is much about Italian culture in the Italian Forum, but there is also much about Australian culture. Yet more importantly, it presents a moment and a place where Italy and Australia meet as a result of a process of mutual mediation where the 'I' is also the 'other', and where the uncanny is located not so much in the feeling of estrangement and displacement as in the curious and rather exciting feeling of being at home outside home. The cafes and the restaurants in the square have similar menus to those one can find in Italy; one can have an ice cream and stroll around under the portico window--shopping while listening to and observing the passers--by. The atmosphere is almost right. There remains, though, an excess which rings persistently in the ears; the light is different, the statue of Dante is the wrong proportion, and the people move with a sort of self--conscious mannerism as though they were part of a performance, acting both the part of themselves and that of the other. Welcome to the transnational place.
But let us proceed step by step, starting with the phenomenological experience, and the significance that place and context acquire in the philosophical project of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger returns to the notion of 'inhabiting' and 'dwelling' with a continuity that is neither coincidental nor accidental. Moreover, he does so at crucial moments of philosophical conceptualisation, the same ones that underpin his idea of Dasein; that is, Heidegger's peculiar understanding of individuality and being. In 'Letter to Humanism' Heidegger states, for example, that language is the house of being and, analogously, that being is the house of language. 2 In 'Building Dwelling Thinking' he argues that the very meaning of being is to be found in the situatedness on earth, which for him equates with the notion of inhabiting.
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According to Heidegger we are humans because we inhabit the earth, and we do so by dwelling in a house that is given by language. At first this may seem to be a rather uncontroversial argument, especially within the framework of an a--priori temporal Benjamin and Heidegger both understood human individuality as that which is marked by the experience of language, but whereas Heidegger focused on specific,
given languages, which, in his case, were pre--Socratic Greek and German, Benjamin chose to approach language from the interrogation of the palimpsest, that is 'pure language'. In essays such as 'The Task of the Translator' and 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Man', Benjamin attempted to follow the development of languages starting from a mythical and ideal language-'pure language', the language before the fall. His interest focused not so much on returning to a supposed origin as that of tracing the mysterious and often invisible connections among different languages; those moments of linguistic thresholds, which for him were also the moments of shared humanity. Benjamin located these moments in the interstitial experience par excellence: the process of translation. 4 For Heidegger, translation was instead a mode of inquiry that would bring him closer and closer to the origin, to the source text, to the pre--Socratic writings, that is, a mode in which he saw the authentic traits of being. 5 This process would allow him to replicate the experience of pre--Socratic thought through German. 6 Heidegger recognised in the soil and world of ancient Greece signs of the earth that he considered to be quintessentially human, and attempted to relive them by recuperating and finding them in his writings and the writings of other authors who wrote in German, including Hölderlin, Rilke, George and Trakl. 7
For Heidegger earth, house, language are, then, strongly connected to a place and a tradition, and to a sense of quasi--deterministic belonging and authenticity.
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Let us return, now, to the notion of individuality as that of inhabiting a house made of language. By applying the Heideggerian perspective the house is imposing, extremely sophisticated and beautiful, but also gated, intimidating and excluding. In this essay I argue that the idea of inhabiting, and of human individuality as the house of being, are fruitful ideas if located in a space which is defined by movement, porosity and interstitiality, and in an urban and architectural paradigm which is based on openness and inclusiveness. Transnational experiences and localities can be, to this end, extremely instructive. It is essential to articulate the notion of dwelling within an urban context in which building is the result of complex cultural and social interactions, characterised not only by the negotiation of space and materials but also, and more importantly, by a range of symbolic values. The symbolism that I refer to here is the product of mnemonic and emotional experiences marked by time and space, which in the case of the migratory and transnational experiences is arrived at through a delicate negotiation of the past and the present, and the 'here' (the current locality) and the 'there' (the native locality).
The dwelling that I speak of is, therefore, a double dwelling divided between the present at--hand and the remembered past, and as such it inhabits a space, which is both interstitial and liminal, simultaneously in--place and out--of--place.
I have chosen the Italian Forum in Sydney as a working sample of the place--out--of--place, and as a case study to interrogate the processes of inhabitation that, according to Heidegger, makes us what we are. But contrary to Heidegger, for whom inhabiting is the cipher of authenticity and purity, the concept of being that I would like to provide here is that of the cosmopolitan and transnational dweller who lives in multiple spaces at once, both in reality and imagination, in the present, and in the past through memory. Translation, and in particular Benjamin's understanding of translation as the mediation of languages, adds a significant layer of meaning, as well as critical inquiry, to the category of the transnational insofar as the transnational experience and lexicon are invariably and always translated. It is in this sense that co--participation and the willingness to enable a shared experience are inherently acts of translation conducted on the neutral ground of liminality. The process, and not the final and polished result which is usually characterised by the imperative of domestication, is the quintessential trait of translation and the transnational. I might be considered cynical or naive, yet I maintain that the modest success of the commercial aspect of the Italian Forum is a powerful testimony to the processual nature of its development, over which a sense of incompleteness has persisted.
The first section of this article discusses the city and its spaces as loci of plural encounters and formations, which is at the basis of our understanding of civitas. This is discussed in comparison with and contrast to Heidegger's philosophy of space.
The second section looks at the idea of social objects by drawing on the work of Foucault. This discussion is related to Freud's notion of the uncanny and argues that the cohabitation and co--presence of supposedly antonymic concepts such as authentic/inauthentic, in/out, self/other are incredibly fruitful impulses toward human production and creativity. Examples from and references to the Italian VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013
48
Forum are interspersed throughout the essay. The essay concludes with an overview of the square in Leichhardt, which, by this stage, will have hopefully revealed a signature that either consciously or unconsciously, by default or will, can be inscribed in the multiple zone of transnational experiences.
-POLIS AND CIVITAS
The history of urban settlements and their formation is marked by two ideas that are the development of the same desire for socialisation, security, preservation, and community. The Greek polis and the Roman civitas are related, and yet based on diametrically opposed conditions of belonging. They both strive to offer unity and a degree of social togetherness predicated on the process of integration and mutual acceptance; but whereas the polis aims at achieving this through the insistence on an values determined by the authenticity of language and traditions (let us remember that for Heidegger the house is also the house of language), the other, the civitas, is characterised by serendipity and plurality, including the plurality of languages.
The contemporary city is an interesting blend of polis and civitas in which the desire to guard and preserve is constantly checked by the opposite thrust to include and welcome. It is the constant tension between these two forces that characterises the development of the contemporary urban design, and also ignites the imagination and symbolic production of social objects and structures. between centre and periphery, CBD and suburbs altered too; the distinction that was described above became less obvious.
The same combination of impulses that define the polis as opposed to civitas are also found in individual urban developments such as at the Italian Forum.
Nowhere more than in places that celebrate cultural encounters does the resilience of allegedly cultural, religious and language identity remain and endure. But they do Griffero writes about the mutual influence between objects and individuals, and how particular objects create a particular atmosphere that pulls the individual in.
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Griffero goes so far as to argue for a new aesthetics based on atmospheres that characterise choices and behaviour. One would be mistaken to think that such urban developments signal an end to the tensions and anxieties revolving around Otherness, and the eclipse of notions such as authenticity and inauthenticity. These conflicts remain, but are pushed further out, to the margin of the city, and become invisible to the majority of the transnational and cosmopolitan curios. These are the poor, disenfranchised, highly ethnic areas the margins of which are geographic, psychological and emotional, and for which no aesthetics, let alone an aesthetic atmosphere, exist. It is in this sense that the transnational space, of which the Italian Forum is an example, symbolises at one and the same time the attempt to capitalise on the fascination of the Other while assimilating her by a process of domestication. This is achieved through a complex and rather subtle manipulation of Otherness and its uncanny presence; the uncanny VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013 52 is maintained and preserved yet turned into a performance in which the 'I' must play an important part: 'I' am the other and assume her trait by projecting myself into a place which is both real and virtual. Reality is provided by history, and the epochal transformation makes history virtual.
What has happened to Heidegger's house, and to his idea of inhabiting as the quintessential trait of humanity? The concept of inhabiting is very pertinent and still current, as is that of the house as a metaphor for the necessity of place. What is at stake here, though, is the confrontation of two very distinct notions of house; one is based on a strong sense of belonging and tradition (Heidegger) , while the framework of the other is instead offered by a sense of belonging which paradoxically appears to defy the very notion of belonging. In other words, it is an identity that is based on a virtual belonging, which is at the same time authentic and inauthentic, same and other, in and out. Both identities are still relevant, and still drive political as well as economic discourses, in the context of which the struggle to arrive at a united and integrated Europe made of different states (houses) is an interesting case. Here, I am not so much interested in providing a close analysis of these two tendencies as in investigating the creative and aesthetic processes that underpin the elaboration of places which, at first, could be considered out--of--place.
These are interstitial places, which introduce a language and a textuality that are both in and out. It is to this language and to its necessity that I would now like to turn.
-LANGUAGE IN-PLACE AND OUT-OF-PLACE
Knowledge and understanding are based on experience, which since Kant has been predicated on an encounter between the subject and the object of knowledge. In order to acquire knowledge of an object, the subject must initiate a process of understanding, which is also a movement towards that object. It is in this sense that, according to Kant, knowledge always takes place in the space in--between the subject and the object. ('We are convinced, we know that everything speaks within one given culture:
linguistic structures bequeath their form to the order of things')).
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Foucault's statement is very important in the context of this essay, not only because it stresses the symbolic significance of any signs (objects, buildings etc.) regardless of their status, but also because he adds his voice to the centrality of location with regard to textual production. In line with Dilthey, Foucault emphasises that aesthetic production is the result of a complex interrelation between form and image, which in turn are dependent on the uniqueness of a culture, which is also its situatedness. If spatiality is central to Foucault's understanding of artistic production, so is temporality to the extent that the expression of a culture is decisively marked by time and space. Foucault refers to visual culture in order to exemplify his thought, reminding us that 'style' and symbols are the product of
'formally established rules' ('les règles formelles d'un style').
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These rules will help the viewer to decipher whether the representation on a canvas refers to an angel or a man, and to imagination or reality. They will also guide the interpretation of a gesture that expresses a theme and a concept according to a given typology of rules in which a system of values is incarnated. Yet these value systems change from country to country, and their representation will be different in Dürer and in Le
Brun, and will change in the passage from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. ('conditions formelles qui peuvent faire que la signification apparaisse').
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In this context he challenges Husserl's view that meaning is always already present apart from and in autonomy of individuals, who, by this assumption, are inextricably and pre--determinately invested and influenced by meaning. By contrast, Foucault believes that meaning 'does not happen in isolation, it is not "already" there, or if it is "already" there this is the result of a certain number of conditions, which are formal
conditions' ('le sens n'apparait pas tout seul, il n'est pas "déjà là", ou plutôt, "il y est déjà", oui, mais sous un certain nombre de conditions qui sont des conditions formelles').
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The task, therefore, is to investigate the formal conditions that give way to meaning. The specificity of Foucault's philosophical project is that it brackets the centrality of consciousness and human individuality as he embarks on this quest. ('Thinking from the Outside'), 24 Foucault illustrates his theory of a new relational mode based on the dislocation of subjectivity by focusing, precisely, on the writings of Maurice Blanchot. What emerges from this essay is a language that goes outside of its conventional function, and enters a neutral space in which subject and object cohabit in the absence of hierarchies and attempts of possession and coercion of the object of knowledge on the part of a language at the service of an inquiring subject.
Language becomes free of the ordering subject and entertains a new rapport with the thing of language, which is thus simultaneously in language and outside language. On this point, it is important to quote a central passage of Foucault's essay: 
'immédiate négation de ce qu'il dit, dans un silence qui n'est pas l'intimité d'un secret, mais le pur dehors où les mots se déroulent indéfiniment.
It is necessary to reconsider thinking. It must be thought not so much as the expression of interiority-a kind of central certainty from which it cannot be displaced-as the experience of a limit at which it will be continuously questioned. Arrived at the border of its very self, thinking will not emerge from the positivity of dialectic contradiction, but instead from the void in which it erases itself. It must proceed towards this void, accepting in turn its effacement within the rumour, the negative immediacy of what it says, and the silence which is not the secret of an intimacy, but the pure outside in which words unfold indefinitely.
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Foucault emphasises the experience of a language that is located in--between the identity of the conscious subject and that of an outside devoid of identity and authenticity. The challenge confronting this language and the subjectivity that inhabits it is to embrace the outside and let the familiar and the known accept and enter the experience of out--of--place, the different and the uncanny. There is, though, another important section in Freud's essay 'The Uncanny' that warrants our attention, especially given our focus on social objects, and urban spaces: texts and language that carry a symbolic significance, and relate to reality through a narrative rich in meanings, and metaphors that are not without analogy to those found in more traditional and conventional texts such as fiction or film.
Towards the end of his essay Freud stresses 'we should differentiate between the uncanny that we actually experience and the uncanny that we merely picture or read about' 31 since fiction demands we suspend disbelief, or clearly states that what is represented therein is pure fantasy (Freud makes the examples of fairy tales, but also of fictional texts such as Dante's Comedy, in which the continuous appearance of dead people, souls, demons and angels do not produce the experience of the uncanny in the reader). Freud continues by saying the experience changes, however, should 'the writer pretend to move in the world of common reality'.
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Then, expectations and experiences will be subjected to similar reaction of fear and the uncanny as those experienced in reality. Freud is not only emphasising here the important distinction between fiction and reality, imagination and contingency, he is also referring to formal processes of aesthetic production, the forms producing It is, in other words, the presence of an extra linguistic thing, which although necessary to the work of art and in a constant relation to it, is always already external to it.
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It is this thing that propels the process of creative production and representation and makes art possible by remaining utterly other from art. This void acquires for Lacan ontological and aesthetic significance insofar as the thing is the unsayable that inhabits every act of artistic creation.
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It is because of this that in Lacan the thing becomes a strong metaphor for the desire to reconnect with the void of the inevitable loss, be it God or the mother figure. 37 Artistic production becomes, therefore, a process of sublimation, that has the purpose of constructing fetishes and objects through which to contemplate the thing of art. Of course, this is a false hope insofar as the object is a mere simulacrum of the thing, while the thing itself stays invisible yet present.
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To summarise, the objects that acquire meanings through the process of creative production contain, and yet cannot fully express, the origin, the thing, that instantiated the act of creating in the first instance. They are a kind of translation in which the voice of the original echoes in the absence of the voice. It is the desire to reconnect with the thing that drives the artist to produce something in which the thing itself is absent and yet its symbol is crystallised into a meaningful form. The transnational language of urban spaces follows a similar trajectory. The dynamic at work between the original culture (the past) and the adopted culture (the present)
generates a complex alphabet of sign--meaning determined by what Husserl would call the active process of memorisation, in which the desire to say is triggered by a memory that comes to react with the experience of the present.
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The thing of the creative process, in this instance, is not so much the lost origin of the past as the threshold and encounter between past and present. Paul Carter would call this zone a turbulent zone; a highly charged area of cultural exchange in which rigid VOLUME19 NUMBER2 SEP2013 62 understandings of authenticity and identity are questioned. 40 The object of transnational language is, therefore, the symbol given to turbulent encounters and the process of memorisation, whose process of formation is strongly coloured by the The 'bad translation' of the Italian Forum alerts us to the fact that we are not in Italy, that we cannot be in Italy, yet it tells us that we are in an interstitial place, the result of the desire to re--enact a complex experience in which the origin is only an element of the equation.
What I failed to notice then, though, is that the Italian Forum is much more than the sum of the original/translation relation, and that its complexity must be 
